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Summary 
Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic 
growth, reform, and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, 
non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress 
conducts regular oversight of these programs, repeatedly revising and extending them. Two major 
issues face the 111th Congress: (1) the expiration of two preference programs by December 31, 
2010; and (2) possible legislative action on broader reform of the preference programs based on 
comprehensive reviews in hearings held in both the House and the Senate earlier in this Congress. 
Congress established five trade preference programs. The Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) applies to developing countries as a whole. In addition, there are four regional programs 
established in the Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA), the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act (CBERA); the Caribbean Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Haitian Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement 
(HOPE) Act. Both the GSP and the ATPA are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010. 
Unlike free trade agreements, trade preferences are unilateral, so developing countries do not 
have to provide reciprocal trade benefits to the United States. To qualify for tariff preferences, 
however, they must meet certain eligibility criteria, which vary by program. Examples include 
adopting internationally recognized worker rights, providing adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and operating an open market economy under established multilateral trade rules. 
In the 111th Congress, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have held 
hearings on the operation and impact of these programs. In the first session, Congress 
legislatively extended the GSP and ATPA for a one-year, ending December 31, 2010 (P.L. 111-
124). In the second session, it has extended provisions in the CBPTA and HOPE Act through 
September 30, 2020 in the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-171). Other bills 
introduced include H.R. 1837 and S. 1665, which would extend ATPA to additional countries; and 
S. 1141 and S. 4101, which would expand product coverage for certain least-developed countries. 
Trade preferences are permitted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) “enabling clause,” which allows members to provide 
more favorable treatment to developing countries. Other developed countries such as Canada, 
Japan, the European Union (EU), and Australia provide similar preferences. In the WTO Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) round of multilateral trade negotiations, both developed and 
developing WTO members agreed to provide duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) preferential access to 
least-developed countries, subject to adoption of the agreement. 
Evaluations of the benefits of trade preferences have been mixed. Many developing countries 
have used tariff preferences to enhance their competitiveness in certain industries, particularly 
apparel. In other countries, preferences are used to export major commodities such as petroleum 
products, which may be less supportive of long-term economic diversification and development. 
Meeting the needs of the least developing countries is a core policy issue that continues to drive 
the debate over the design of preference programs. Consumers and some U.S. industries and 
workers benefit from the additional trade, others compete directly with it, so perspectives on trade 
preferences vary despite their overall costs apparently being small. 
This report discusses the major U.S. trade preference programs, their possible economic effects, 
stakeholder interests, and legislative options. 
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Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible 
countries. Congress conducts regular oversight of these programs, often revising and extending 
them. Two major issues face the 111th Congress: (1) the expiration of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) and the Andean preference program on December 31, 2010; and (2) possible 
legislative action on broader reform of the preference programs based on comprehensive reviews 
in hearings held in both the House and the Senate earlier in this Congress. 
Background 
The multilateral trading system that has evolved since the end of World War II is centered on the 
guiding tenet of nondiscrimination. It is embodied in the most favored nation (MFN) principle of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).1 The economic rationale for this foundational idea rests on avoiding the 
type of protectionist policies prominent during the inter-war period that exacerbated the Great 
Depression. As fundamental as MFN treatment is to the conduct of modern trade, the 
GATT/WTO also allows for certain exceptions, one being special and differential treatment 
(SDT) for developing countries. 
Special trade treatment permits, among other policies, preferential programs that reduce tariffs on 
certain goods from eligible developing countries. Lower tariffs support an export development 
strategy that is based on increasing trade and diversifying it away from traditional commodity 
exports into more value-added goods in industry and manufacturing. Because commodity prices 
have declined over the long run and experienced periods of extreme volatility over shorter periods 
of time, countries dependent on them often find their trade position weakened over time.2 Exports 
are also key to development of industry in countries with small domestic markets. By diversifying 
trade to other sectors and industries it is hoped that developing economies will attract more 
investment, create more jobs, become more stable, and grow faster.3 
Many developed countries have unilateral trade preference programs; Congress has legislatively 
established five in the United States. The first was the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
established in the Trade Act of 1974. It applies to developing countries as a whole. In addition, 
there are four regional programs that followed, created in the Andean Trade Preference Act 
(APTA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA); the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Haitian 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act (discussed in detail below). The 
regional programs were built on the GSP concept, but are more targeted and tend to offer more 
generous and flexible access to the U.S. market. 
1
 In the United States MFN treatment is defined in law as normal trade relations (NTR). 
2
 The terms of trade or the ratio of export prices to import prices tends to fall with commodity prices over the long run, 
causing deteriorated trade and current account positions. 
3
 Bernard Hoekman, Will Martin, and Carlos A. Primo Braga, "Quantifying the Value of Preferences and Potential 
Erosion Losses," in Trade Preference Erosion: Measurement and Policy Response, ed. Bernard Hoekman, Will Martin, 
and Carlos A. Primo Braga (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 1-2. 
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Trade preferences provide duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible developing 
countries. All U.S. preference programs are unilateral, meaning that they do not require reciprocal 
trade concessions. Congress conducts oversight of these programs, revising and extending them 
periodically.4 In order to qualify to receive benefits, beneficiary developing countries must meet 
eligibility criteria, which vary by program. Some examples include ensuring that prospective 
countries make strides toward enhancing the rule of law, adopting internationally recognized 
worker rights, supporting counternarcotics policies, and providing open markets for U.S. exports. 
Preference programs, as such, are regarded by many as integral elements of U.S. trade, 
development, and foreign policy. 
During the 111th Congress, both the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees 
have held hearings to evaluate preference programs and possible means to improve their 
effectiveness. Congress passed legislation in the first session that extends the GSP and ATPA for 
one year through December 31, 2010 (P.L. 111-124). In the second session, Congress has 
extended the CBPTA through September 30, 2020, and granted additional preferences to Haiti in 
the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-171). Other bills introduced include H.R. 
1837 and S. 1665, which would expand the ATPA to additional countries; and S. 1141 and S. 
4101, which would expand product coverage for certain least-developed countries, but Congress 
has not acted on these legislative initiatives. 
Supporters of trade preferences include beneficiary developing country governments who have 
established industries and jobs partially as a result of preference programs, U.S. importers, 
including retailers and U.S. consuming industries, and U.S. producers working in joint production 
with assembly plants in developing countries. These groups tend to favor longer-term renewal of 
preferences to ensure more predictability, which is one important factor in investment and 
sourcing decisions. Stakeholders opposed to preference programs include U.S. manufacturers of 
competing import-sensitive products and some labor groups representing workers negatively 
affected by them, although the strict labor requirements of preference programs can attract 
support from labor groups. Generally, preference programs receive broad support in Congress, 
but some lawmakers have reservations about their design and operation. 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
Authorized by Congress in 1974, the GSP is the oldest and largest trade preference program, 
currently providing trade benefits to 131 countries. It was last extended through December 31, 
2010, by P.L. 111-124. The GSP statute (Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, as 
amended) authorizes the President to grant duty-free status to selected imports from two 
categories of countries: beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and least-developed country 
beneficiaries (LDBDCs),5 the latter designating additional special treatment for the poorest 
developing countries.6 The President may designate eligible countries, subject to various 
4
 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Foreign Trade, “Hearing on the Operation, 
Impact, and Future of the U.S. Preference Programs,” Hearing Advisory, November 10, 2009. 
5
 According to the GSP statute (see 19 U.S.C. § 2467) beneficiary and least-developed beneficiary countries must be 
designated as such by Executive Order or Presidential Proclamation. Least-developed beneficiaries are designated 
according to the same eligibility criteria as beneficiary developing countries and must comply with the same 
requirements, but receive tariff benefits on additional products. 
6
 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467, as amended. For a more complete description of the GSP, see CRS Report RL33663, 
Generalized System of Preferences: Background and Renewal Debate, by Vivian C. Jones. 
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mandatory and discretionary conditions as set out in the statute.7 In general, these include: 
providing equitable and reasonable market access; taking actions to adopt internationally 
recognized worker rights; supporting private ownership and repatriation of capital; not engaging 
in practices that would harm U.S. economic interests; and supporting certain U.S. anti-terrorism 
policies.8 The GSP program is implemented by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), an 
interagency group chaired by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 
In order to qualify for GSP eligibility, products must be imported directly from a BDC, where at 
least 35% of the value of materials and/or processing must be completed.9 The President is 
authorized to designate products as eligible for GSP status, but many agricultural, textile, apparel, 
and other “import sensitive” products are excluded.10 In addition, a country (LDC beneficiaries 
excluded) may lose eligibility for a particular product due to statutory competitive need 
limitations (CNLs). An automatic CNL is triggered if imports of a product from a BDC: (1) 
exceed a specified threshold value ($140 million in 2010); or (2) account for 50% or more of total 
U.S. imports of the product. After the threshold is reached, CNLs go into effect on July 1 of the 
next calendar year and may be waived under certain conditions.11 
Countries are also mandatorily “graduated” from the GSP program if the President determines 
that they have become a “high income” country.12 Benefits may also be limited or withdrawn if 
the President determines that a beneficiary is sufficiently competitive based an assessment of its 
level of economic development, per capita income, or living standards.13 
Regional Programs 
The Caribbean 
In 1983, Congress created the first regionally-targeted preference program with strong bipartisan 
passage of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).14 The Act provided limited 
duty-free entry of select Caribbean exports as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy 
response to deteriorating economic and political conditions in the region in the 1980s. Although 
considered an important new program at the time, its effects were limited by the exclusion of key 
exports, especially apparel. Apparel were (and are) major products of the region, but were 
designated “import sensitive” in the United States. CBERA was made permanent with a few 
7
 19 U.S.C. § 2462. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 19 U.S.C. § 2463(a)(2). 
10
 19 U.S.C.§ 2463(b). 
11
 19 U.S.C.§ 2463(c). If a CNL is in place on a product, an interested party from a beneficiary country can request 
redesignation of the product’s eligibility if imports of the product fall below the CNL limits in a subsequent year. 
12
 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e). The last countries graduated from the GSP were Equatorial Guinea and Croatia (effective 
January 1, 2011) because the President determined that they had become “high income” countries. See Proclamation 
8467 of December 23, 2009, To Modify Duty-Free Treatment Under the Generalized System of Preferences, and for 
Other Purposes, 74 Federal Register 69221. The per capita GNP limit is set at the lower bound of the World Bank’s 
definition of a “high income” country which was $11,116 in 2006 (see USTR, Generalized System of Preferences 
Guidebook). 
13
 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(2). 
14
 P.L. 98-67, 19 U.S.C. § 2701ff. 
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modest additions of eligible products in the Caribbean Basin Economic Expansion Act of 1990 
(CBI II).15 
Additional preferences were extended to the Caribbean region in the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA) in May 2000.16 In the CBTPA, Congress effectively extended benefits 
to eligible Caribbean countries through fiscal year 2008 equivalent to those given to Mexico 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The CBPTA also enhanced product 
coverage to include certain apparel goods—provided that the fabrics were sourced in the United 
States or the Caribbean and made from U.S. yarn. Congress recently extended CBTPA through 
September 30, 2020 in the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010.17 
Implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) on March 1, 2006 shifted treatment of imports from the largest Caribbean apparel 
producing countries from a unilateral preference program to the more liberal benefits afforded 
under the new, reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA).18 Haiti was the only major apparel-
producing country in the region that was not included in CAFTA-DR.19 Because Haiti’s economic 
fortunes continued to deteriorate, Congress provided uniquely generous and flexible unilateral 
preferences to Haiti’s apparel sector by amending CBERA to include the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I).20 These preferences were 
further enhanced and extended by the HOPE II Act of 2008,21 and again by the HELP Act. 
The HOPE Act, as amended, differs from other U.S. preference programs because it allows duty-
free treatment for Haitian apparel exports made from limited amounts of lower-cost third-country 
fabrics and other inputs from countries outside the region or not part of a trade agreement with 
the United State (e.g., many Asian producers). The eligibility criteria are based on GSP 
provisions, with an additional requirement mandating detailed United Nations monitoring of 
Haitian firms to ensure that they conform to internationally recognized worker rights.22 
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) 
The United States originally extended special duty treatment to imports from Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Bolivia in the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), initially enacted on December 4, 
1991, and most recently extended through December 31, 2010.23 It lapsed on December 4, 2001, 
but was subsequently renewed and amended on August 6, 2002 in the Andean Trade Promotion 
and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).24 ATPDEA renewed ATPA trade preferences and also 
expanded the preferences to include additional products previously excluded under ATPA, 
15
 P.L. 101-382. For more background, see CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade 
Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
16
 P.L. 106-200, Title III, 19 U.S.C. §2703. 
17
 P.L. 111-171. See CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
18
 P.L. 109-53, 19 U.S.C. § 4001 ff. 
19
 Others include the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
20
 P.L. 109-432, 19 U.S.C. 2703a. 
21
 P.L. 110-246, Subtitle D, Part I. 
22
 CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
23
 Title II of P.L. 102-182, 19 U.S.C. § 3201ff, most recently extended by P.L. 111-124. 
24
 Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210. 
Congressional Research Service 4 
Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options 
including certain petroleum and petroleum products, textiles and apparel, footwear, and tuna in 
flexible containers, among others. 
The purpose of ATPA is to provide preferential duty treatment to U.S. imports from beneficiary 
countries to promote economic growth, provide “legitimate” business opportunities, and expand 
job creation as alternatives to illegal crop production and drug trafficking.25 The ATPA is one part 
of a broader U.S. initiative to address the drug trade problem in the Andean region. Other efforts 
include drug crop eradication and additional counter-narcotics activities. 
In December 2008, then-President George W. Bush determined that Bolivia failed to meet ATPA 
beneficiary criteria and suspended Bolivia’s status as a beneficiary country for failure to 
cooperate in counternarcotics efforts. On June 30, 2009, President Barack Obama extended this 
determination. Reinstatement of Bolivia as an ATPA beneficiary country will require 
congressional approval. 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)26 originated in 2000 as part of an increasing 
U.S. effort to promote the development of, and deeper economic integration with, sub-Saharan 
Africa. The preference program was last amended and renewed through September 30, 2015.27 
GSP benefits were also extended to AGOA-eligible countries until that time, irrespective of any 
other congressional determinations on GSP extension.28 
AGOA provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries more generous duty-free access than 
afforded under GSP, including special access for certain textile and apparel products that are 
designated “import sensitive” in the GSP statute.29 AGOA also provides U.S. technical assistance 
and trade capacity building to eligible governments and businesses through four regional trade 
hubs in Gaborone, Botswana; Nairobi, Kenya; Accra, Ghana; and Dakar, Senegal.30 
Currently, 38 countries are eligible to receive AGOA benefits. AGOA-eligible countries must 
demonstrate, among other things, that they: (1) are making continual progress toward establishing 
a market-based economy; (2) do not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security 
and foreign policy interests; and (3) do not engage in gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights or provide support for international terrorism.31 
25
 See P.L. 107-210, Div. C, Title XXXI, sec. 3102. 
26
 Title I of P.L. 106-200 (19 U.S.C. § 3701 – 3741), as amended. 
27
 P.L. 109-432, Div. D, Title VI, section 6004. 
28
 19 U.S.C. § 2466a (a)(1)(B). 
29
 19 U.S.C. § 3721. 
30
 19 U.S.C. § 3732(b). Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade 
and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act: 
The Eighth of Eight Annual Reports, May 2008, p. 47. 
31
 19 U.S.C. § 3703. 
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Preference Programs and the WTO 
The GATT and WTO agreements are based on the fundamental principle that unconditional most-
favored-nation (non-discriminatory) status must be offered to the products of other Members with 
respect to tariffs and other trade-related measures.32 Programs offering preferential treatment, 
such as the GSP, are inconsistent with this principle. Because these programs were designed to 
help less developed countries through trade expansion, parties to the GATT provided a legal basis 
for one-way tariff preferences in the 1979 “Enabling Clause,” which stated that “contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties” under certain conditions.33 The Enabling 
Clause was formally incorporated into the GATT 1994 when the Uruguay Round Agreements— 
the same agreements that established the WTO—entered into force on January 1, 1995. 
Other developed countries offer special trade preferences for developing countries including 
Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Australia.34 Some developing nations, such as India and 
Brazil, also provide tariff concessions to least developed countries (LDCs).35 Generally, each 
preference-granting country extends to eligible developing countries (as determined by each 
benefactor) an exemption from duties (in the form of duty-free access or reduced tariffs) on 
designated “non-sensitive” manufactured products and agricultural goods. Product coverage and 
the type of preferential treatment offered vary widely.36 Although most preference schemes 
(including all U.S. programs) admit eligible products duty-free, some countries provide tariff 
reductions, rather than complete exemption, from duties. The Australian system, for example, is 
based on a five percentage point margin of preference, meaning that when the Australian General 
Tariff (GT) is 5% or higher on a given product, the amount of the tariff is reduced by 5 percentage 
points for products of beneficiary countries. When the GT rate is 5% or less, the preferential rate 
is zero.37 
Other developed countries also offer regional preferences, or preferences that “reward” 
developing countries that comply with additional eligibility criteria such as anti-corruption 
measures, environmental sustainability goals, or core worker rights provisions. For example, the 
European Union offers additional duty-free access to its market to LDC beneficiaries under the 
“Everything But Arms” preference,38 as well as an incentive-based program (known as GSP+) 
that provides enhanced benefits for “vulnerable countries” (in terms of size or limited 
diversification in its exports). GSP+ beneficiaries must have ratified and effectively implemented 
32
 CRS Report RS22183, Trade Preferences for Developing Countries and the World Trade Organization (WTO), by 
Jeanne J. Grimmett. 
33
 Ibid. The Enabling Clause replaced a 1974 GATT waiver on preferences under which the United States and other 
countries originally adopted and implemented preference programs. 
34
 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD), there are currently 13 
countries that offer GSP programs: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
35
 Julia V. Sekkel, Summary of Major Trade Preference Programs, Center for Global Development, April 2009, p. 15. 
36
 Sanchez Arnau, Juan C., The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade Organization, London: 
Cameron May, Ltd., 2002, p. 187. 
37
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Generalized System of Preferences on the 
Scheme of Australia, UNCTAD Technical Cooperation Project on Market Access, Trade Laws and Preferences, June 
2000 (INT/97/A06), p. 5, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc56_en.pdf. 
38European Council Regulation (EC) 416/2001. 
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27 specified international conventions in the fields of human rights, core labor standards, 
sustainable development, and good governance.39 
Also in the WTO, as a part of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, developed 
country members and “developing country members declaring themselves in a position to do so” 
agreed to provide “duty-free and quota-free” (DFQF) market access for all products originating 
from all least-developed countries “in a manner that ensures stability, security, and 
predictability.”40 Members “facing difficulties” would be permitted to exempt 3% of all tariff 
lines, provided that steps are taken to build the list of covered products until total DFQF is 
reached.41 Since the DDA is a “single undertaking” (which means that nothing is finally agreed 
until everything is agreed), the DFQF agreement reached in 2005, will not be implemented until 
the negotiating round is concluded.42 
Stakeholder Perspectives 
Like all public policies, the costs and benefits do not fall uniformly to all affected parties. This is 
reflected in various stakeholder responses to trade preferences. Supporters include beneficiary 
developing country governments, producers, workers, and exporters. Many of these countries 
receive foreign investment based on U.S. trade preferences, resulting in increased employment in 
certain industries.43 For these countries, jobs and related income created by U.S. trade preference 
programs have become an important element for economic growth and development. Many 
beneficiary stakeholders express concern that if preferences are not renewed, other low-cost 
countries such as China would benefit at their expense.44 
U.S. manufacturers who import intermediate products through the various trade preference 
programs in downstream products also support trade preferences. Some U.S. producers, 
especially in the U.S. textile and apparel industries, have made use of preferences to remain 
competitive through cooperative relationships with certain beneficiaries, especially the Caribbean 
and Latin American countries.45 Businesses that benefit from preference programs favor longer-
term renewal of trade preferences because they provide predictability when signing import 
contracts and making investment decisions.46 
39European Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008. See also the European Commission website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/. 
40
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, Annex F, December 18, 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, by Ian F. 
Fergusson. 
43
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009, Testimony of Alan Han of Nien Hsing Textile. 
44
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Trade: U.S. Trade Preference Programs Provide Important 
Benefits, but a More Integrated Approach Would Better Ensure Programs Meet Shared Goals, GAO-08-443, March 
2008, p. 40, http://www.gao.gov. 
45
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009. Testimony of David Love, Senior Vice President 
and Chief Supply Chain Officer, Levi Strauss & Co. 
46U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Trade: U.S. Trade Preference Programs Provide Important 
Benefits, but a More Integrated Approach Would Better Ensure Programs Meet Shared Goals, GAO-08-443, March 
2008, p. 42, http://www.gao.gov. 
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Trade preferences reflect both economic development and foreign policy goals. In addition to the 
economic benefits, eligibility criteria create incentives for beneficiary countries to support U.S. 
objectives such as adopting and enforcing internationally recognized worker rights, reducing 
barriers to investment, and enforcing intellectual property rights.47 In addition, U.S. regional 
preferences created with particular goals in mind—such as eradication of drug production in the 
case of the Andean trade preference program—create incentives to fulfill additional U.S. policy 
goals.48 Organized labor, for example, tends to support trade preferences because worker rights 
provisions have led to improvements in labor rights in some regions. Labor officials have cited 
the GSP process, specifically annual country practice reviews, as helpful in addressing 
enforcement and rule-of-law issues relating to compliance.49 Labor support, however, is also 
tempered by the fact that certain workers will be negatively affected by increased imports of 
products with which they compete. 
Stakeholders opposed to preferences programs mostly include U.S. manufacturers of competing 
import-sensitive products. In particular, some in the U.S. textile and apparel industry are opposed 
to unfettered extension of textile and apparel preferences, especially when U.S. workers are 
potentially adversely affected.50 
Economic Issues 
All trade preference programs have in common the goal to promote export-driven growth and 
development in less developed countries. The programs themselves, however, raise multiple 
economic and political issues. Preference program features are a key factor in determining their 
effectiveness. Among key issues is the extent to which preferences: (1) target the developing 
country’s productive capacity; (2) have sufficiently flexible and manageable rules of origin; (3) 
are not overly restricted by domestic interests; and (4) are extended for a sufficiently long period 
of time to attract foreign investment. Because of eligibility requirements that countries must 
accept from the preference giver, and the fact that they can also be unilaterally cut off, there are 
also opportunity costs to preferences.51 
Program Effectiveness—Use of U.S. Trade Preferences 
The value trade preferences provide from a programmatic perspective rests on their ability to 
increase exports from developing countries, particularly away from traditional commodities. The 
value to the exporting countries is equal to what is called the preference margin, which may be 
47
 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. Preference Programs: How Well Do They Work?, 110th Cong., 
1st sess., May 16, 2007, S. Hrg. 110-650 (Washington: GPO, 2007) Statement of Meredith Broadbent, Assistant U.S. 
Trade Representative for Market Access and Telecommunications, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, D.C., p. 4. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 “The Real Record on Workers’ Rights in Central America,” AFL-CIO, April 2005, http://www.aflcio.org. 
50
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009, Testimony of David Hastings, chairman of the 
Mount Vernon Mills, on behalf of the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO). 
51
 Caglar Ozden and Eric Reinhardt, The Perversity of Preferences: The Generalized System of Preferences and 
Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000, The World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper, 
January 2003, p. 2. 
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simply defined as the difference between the MFN and preferential tariffs on exported goods.52 If 
the preference margin is significant, it should contribute to export growth by reducing the import 
cost of goods in the United States relative to competing exports from countries without 
preferences. 
One simple approach to examining the benefits of preference programs is to evaluate their use by 
observed growth in exports, although this provides for only a preliminary understanding.53 For 
example, the total value of imports entering under U.S. preference programs in 2008 was $110.0 
billion in 2008, and $60.5 billion in 2009 (see Figure 1 and Ta b l e 1 ). U.S. imports from all 
countries fell dramatically in 2009, including those entering under preference programs. The 
Great Recession was the major cause of U.S. import compression in 2009, with the decline in 
U.S. consumption of petroleum products being a key trend. For AGOA in particular, the dramatic 
decline in 2009 reflects that 93% of AGOA-eligible imports are petroleum products, the demand 
for which fell precipitously with the economic downturn (see Appendix Tab le A - 2 for data). Such 
a dramatic fall in exports entering under preference programs points to two fundamental 
concerns: the continued dependence on price-volatile commodity exports, and the possible failure 
of preference programs to encourage greater export diversification. 
Figure 1. Imports Entering Under Preference Programs, 2000-2009 
(in billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Source: United States International Trade Commission Trade Dataweb, http://www.usitc.gov. 
52
 The “real” preference margin is better calculated as the difference between the tariff preference on competing goods 
from other developing countries and the tariff preferences offered on goods from the country under study. 52 Hoekman, 
Martin, and Braga, op. cit., p. 4. 
53
 Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Table 1. Imports by Preference Program 
(in billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Trade 
Preference 
Program 
GSP 
ATPA 
AGO A 
CBERA 
CBTPA 
Total 
2000 
16.4 
2.0 
0 
2.6 
0.2 
21.2 
2001 
15.7 
1.7 
7.6 
2.7 
5.6 
33.3 
2002 
17.7 
1.0 
8.3 
2.9 
7.1 
37.0 
2003 
21.3 
5.8 
13.2 
3.0 
7.5 
50.8 
2004 
22.7 
8.4 
22.0 
2.9 
7.9 
63.9 
2005 
26.7 
11.5 
32.7 
3.4 
8.8 
83.1 
2006 
32.6 
13.5 
36.1 
4.0 
6.0 
92.2 
2007 
30.8 
12.3 
42.3 
2.8 
2.7 
90.9 
2008 
31.7 
17.2 
56.4 
3.0 
1.7 
110.0 
2009 
20.3 
9.7 
28.1 
1.1 
1.3 
60.5 
Source: United States International Trade Commission Trade Dataweb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Figure 2 illustrates that only 5.2% of about $1.3 trillion in U.S. imports entered duty-free under 
preference programs in 2008.54 About 16% of U.S. imports entered duty-free (or at reduced 
duties) under reciprocally negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs). In 2008, the largest 
percentage (79%) of U.S. imports entered under most-favored-nation (MFN), also known as 
normal trade relations (NTR) rates.55 The simple average U.S. tariff rate is 3.3%, but tariffs on 
certain items, including some eligible under preference programs, are much higher.56 
Figure 2. Preference Programs as a Percentage of All U.S. Imports, 2008 
Source: United States International Trade Commission Trade Dataweb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
54
 CRS Report RL33577, U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts, by Dick K. Nanto and J. Michael Donnelly. 
55
 While the WTO uses the term "most-favored-nation" to describe nondiscriminatory trade treatment, U.S. law since 
1998 has referred to this treatment as "normal trade relations" (NTR) status. See P.L. 105-206, section 5003. 
56
 World Trade Organization, “United States: Tariffs and Imports, Summary and Duty Ranges,” 
http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/US_e.htm. 
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Preference margins, by and large, tend to be small, providing relatively limited benefit to 
developing countries. More nuanced findings suggest, however, that certain products with high 
tariffs, such as apparel, provide a much greater benefit to those countries able to produce for the 
U.S. market. At the other end of the spectrum, the preference margin on petroleum is much 
smaller because tariffs tend to be small or zero in the case of many countries, and so there is 
much less benefit from a particular preference program. Nor does continuing to rely on petroleum 
exports promote economic diversification conducive for development.57 
There are also costs associated with tariff preferences. Extensive administrative procedures and 
complex rules of origin often diminish their use. Also, benefits may accrue to U.S. importers 
rather than exporters, if they are price setters in the domestic economy. Preferences may also 
diminish production of competing goods in the importing country and cause some trade 
diversion.58 
Figure 3. Foreign Investment Flows to Preference Receiving Countries, 2000-2009 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment 
Database. 
Figure 3 illustrates foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to beneficiary countries by preference 
program from 2000 to 2009, although attributing these trends to preference programs is 
analytically difficult. Nonetheless, between 2000 and 2008, the most dramatic increases in FDI 
flows occurred in GSP beneficiary countries. These countries received more than $350 billion in 
foreign investment in 2008. AGOA countries also experienced slow, but steady FDI growth, from 
$24.8 billion in 2000 to $46.5 billion in 2008. ATPA countries, likewise, experienced slow, steady 
57
 Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit., p.7. 
58
 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
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increases in FDI flows. FDI flows to Latin American and Caribbean beneficiaries of CBERA and 
CBTPA remained relatively stable during the period. As with the record on imports, the decline in 
investment from 2008 to 2009 can be attributed largely to the global economic downturn. 
Developing Country Economic Effects 
For GSP countries, total U.S. imports from all BDCs have increased 250% over a twelve-year 
time period, from $107.8 billion in 1996 to $378.0 billion in 2008. Over the same time period, 
total U.S. imports entering under the GSP program increased at a slower rate, from $11.6 billion 
to $31.2 billion in 2008.59 Together, these data indicate that only about 10% of exports from 
eligible countries enter the United States under the GSP program, a relationship that has remained 
steady or declined slightly over time.60 Thus, in the aggregate, the GSP affects a relatively small 
portion of developing country exports. This is due, in part, to program restrictions on key “import 
sensitive” exports such as textiles and apparel and agricultural goods, and is also perhaps due in 
part to the automatic CNLs on GSP-eligible products. Mandatory graduation of beneficiaries 
from the GSP may also be a factor. 
The Caribbean programs have had varying economic effects depending on how they have been 
structured. The original CBERA program provided few incentives to the major exports of the 
region (i.e., apparel), and so the response was predictably limited. This remained unchanged until 
the CBTPA, passed in 2000, provided duty-free treatment for apparel, among other goods. Since 
Central America is a major source of apparel goods, it was not surprising that U.S. imports under 
CBTPA grew to some 30% of total imports from the region by 2003. Nonetheless, U.S. imports of 
apparel under CBTPA continued to shrink as a percentage of apparel imports from the world, 
perhaps pointing to the limits of preferential tariff treatment in the face of a highly competitive 
global market. With the implementation of the CAFTA-DR, apparel concessions were more 
favorable under the agreement and so were no longer exported under the Caribbean preferences. 
This trend is reflected in the decline of total imports from CBERA countries from $31.8 billion in 
2005 to $19.6 billion in 2008, with goods imported under the CBTPA falling from 28% in 2005 to 
only 9% of total imports from the region by 2008.61 
The Haiti HOPE I Act was used minimally in the first two years, because of its highly 
complicated rules of origin and a short-term extension by Congress that did not entice investor 
response. With the passage of HOPE II, the preferences were made more flexible and generous, 
targeted to both knit and woven textiles and apparel. Simpler rules of origin, particularly those 
that did not require use of U.S. or domestic materials, were widely used. This again points to the 
importance of preference program design as a critical factor for predicting their use. Congress 
amended and enhanced the preferences on products that were imported most frequently under the 
preference when passing the HELP Act of 2010.62 
59As shown in Figure 1, U.S. imports from developing countries, including those entering under preference programs, 
fell dramatically in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. Therefore, we find that 2008 data may be more instructive 
than 2009 data when describing the economic effects of the various preference programs. 
60
 CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Background and Renewal Debate, by Vivian C. Jones. 
61
 CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, by 
J. F. Hornbeck. 
62
 CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
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The effect of the ATPA on the economies of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru has also been 
small but positive. A study by the United States International Trade Commission estimated that 
ATPA helped to expand job opportunities in the flower and asparagus industries, particularly to 
individuals who otherwise might have engaged in illicit drug crop production and related 
activities.63 After ATPA was amended to include textile and apparel articles, all four countries 
experienced related output and employment growth, particularly in Peru and Colombia. The 
textile and apparel sectors have been a source of legitimate economic activity and employment in 
some Andean regions. Industry representatives there are concerned about losing ATPA 
preferences because of the importance of the United States as an export market. The removal of 
Bolivia as a designated ATPA beneficiary amidst political uncertainty has likely affected the 
potential for long-term investment in Bolivia, which may, in turn, have contributed to volatility in 
Bolivia’s FDI flows as well as potential ATPA-related investment.64 
AGOA preferences, combined with macroeconomic reforms, played a positive role in economic 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa in some industry sectors. For example, footwear exports from the 
region grew 33% overall between 2002 and 2006 as a result of duty-free access to the U.S. 
market under AGOA.65 At the same time, African exports continue to be the least diversified of 
all developing regions, and many African economies still remain vulnerable to external shocks 
caused by reliance on primary commodity exports such as oil.66 
Comparative Advantage and Development 
While preferences may lead to important gains in manufacturing growth in some sectors and 
countries, a critical question is whether they help a country exploit a comparative advantage in 
trade, or artificially induce investment in industries that otherwise would be uncompetitive in the 
global market place. Some evidence points to support for comparative advantage in many cases 
where preferences build on an existing or nascent industry, allowing firms to gain a foothold in 
the international marketplace.67 Preferences appear to have provided an opportunity for some of 
the current emerging markets such as India and Brazil to expand their international reach in 
certain markets. For example, India’s utilization rate of the GSP program is very high (about 
83%)68—spurred on, in part, by jewelry exports. The incentives created through the ATPA 
program may also have played a role in the expansion of the flower industry in Colombia and 
Ecuador. According to the Society of American Florists, about 67% of fresh flowers (as sold by 
dollar volume) in the United States are imports, with Colombia and Ecuador as the top two 
exporters. Apparel is an important sector for expanding export diversification in developing 
63
 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers, and 
on Drug Eradication and Crop Substitution, Thirteenth Report, Investigation No. 332-352, Publication 4037, 
September 2008. 
64
 For more information, see the following reports: USITC Publication 4037; Confederación de Empresarios Privados 
de Bolivia, The Importance of ATPDEA for Bolivia, October 2008; and Université de Lausanne (Unil), ATPDEA’s End: 
Effects on Bolivian Real Incomes, by Olivier Cadot, Etchel M. Fonseca, and Synabout Yaye Sakho, February 2008. 
65
 United States International Trade Commission, Sub-Saharan Africa: Factors Affecting Trade Patterns of Certain 
Industries, Investigation Number 332-477, April 2008, http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3989.pdf. 
66
 World Bank, World Trade Indicators 2008. South Africa is the most diversified economy on the continent, despite 
diversification efforts in many middle- and low-income African economies. 
67
 See Raed Safadi and Ralph Latimore, eds., Globalization and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, 
China, South Africa, Organization for International Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2008. 
68
 CRS calculations based on U.S. International Trace Commission (USITC) trade statistics. 
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countries, particularly those with liberal rules of origin.69 Countries such as Haiti have benefitted 
significantly from flexible rules of origin for apparel goods. 
On the other hand, some countries may be encouraged by preferential programs to develop 
industry sectors in which they would otherwise not be able to compete, diverting public and 
private investment fro other uses. Supply constraints and difficult business environments can 
overcome any benefit that tariff preferences may offer.70 
Export Diversification 
Trade preference programs are unlikely to help poor countries achieve their development goals 
unless there is some transformation in their export structure away from primary goods.71 USTR 
officials argue, for example, that AGOA is helping to expand and diversify trade between the 
United States and sub-Saharan Africa by building partnerships between U.S. and African 
businesses.72 According to a 2009 report by the International Trade Administration, U.S. imports 
under AGOA are becoming increasingly diverse. Some of the more significant growth is taking 
place in jewelry and jewelry parts, fruit and nut products, fruit juices, leather products, plastic 
products, and cocoa paste. Apparel production has also benefitted.73 
Because sub-Saharan Africa’s preferential trade with the world still largely consists of oil and 
petroleum products, however, points to the crux of the diversification problem. With petroleum 
accounting for 93% of AGOA trade, the program may not be having the desired effect on Africa’s 
economic development.74 Such a case argues for aid in helping countries in Africa to take fuller 
advantage of the benefits that trade preferences offer and perhaps for reconsideration of programs 
incentives. 
Preference Erosion 
Preference erosion refers to the diminishing of the preference margin because tariff levels are 
being reduced in either multilateral or reciprocal bilateral or regional trade agreements. As tariffs 
fall worldwide, the benefit of zero tariffs in preference programs becomes smaller. It is an 
important point in the Doha Round negotiations from LDC perspectives. Particularly affected are 
countries participating in preference programs that cover most of their trade. There is a 
disincentive for LDCs to support multilateral trade liberalization should it result in reducing the 
69
 Society of American Florists, About the Flower Industry, http://www.aboutflowers.com/about-the-flower-
industry/industry-overview.html and Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
70
 Organization for International Cooperation and Development (OECD), Making Open Markets Work for 
Development, Policy Brief, October 2005, p. 2 and Ibid. 
71
 OECD Secretary-General. The Generalized System of Preferences: Review of the First Decade. Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1983, p. 9. CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: 
Background and Renewal Debate, by Vivian C. Jones. 
72
 Office of the United States Trade Representative. “AGOA Opens Doors for U.S. Businesses,” Press Release, August 
5, 2010. 
73
 Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “U.S.-African Trade Profile,” p. 2, 
http://www.agoa.gov\ and Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
74
“Trade: the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa: Oil is King,” Country Forecast Africa, Economist Intelligence Unit, March 
12, 2010; Kalley, Karanta, “Asia’s Crude Oil Purchases from West Africa Rise Sharply in Q1,” Global Insight, World 
Markets Research Center, March 8, 2010. 
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benefits of their preference programs.75 Products that otherwise face relatively high tariffs, such 
as apparel, are also subject to relatively greater preference erosion. One study cites apparel 
producing countries Cape Verde, Haiti, Malawi, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and Principe as the 
most vulnerable to preference erosion.76 
Given there has not been a multilateral agreement under the WTO since the 1994 Uruguay 
Round, most preference erosion has occurred because of the expanding bilateral and regional 
trade agreements, and the 2005 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which 
eliminated quantitative export restrictions and import quotas.77 Under these circumstances, 
developing countries see the Doha Round as a continuation of trends that reduce their preference 
benefits. There is broad agreement, however, that in the aggregate, preference erosion is 
quantitatively small relative to the global benefits of MFN trade liberalization, although for 
certain countries it may be costly.78 
Country Usage Concentration 
While U.S. preference programs are open to many countries (for example, there are over 130 GSP 
beneficiaries), actual preference usage seems to be highly concentrated in only a few countries. In 
2006, the top 25 preference beneficiaries accounted for 95 percent of U.S. preference imports.79 
As part of the debate over preference programs, some discussion has gravitated toward 
reconsidering their design in ways that would broaden their use, particularly by LDCs that may 
not be endowed with energy exports or have limited capability to develop apparel manufacturing. 
Eligibility Issues 
Trade preferences, by their nature, divide countries into two camps: those who receive them and 
those that do not. This dichotomy raises some political issues that affect attitudes toward 
preference programs. Countries that have preferential access to developed economies want to 
maintain that advantage. They do this by advocating for precluding the extension of preferences 
to other countries. Large developing countries also lobby to ensure that their continued benefit is 
not jeopardized by a change in graduation or other rules that might reduce their eligibility. 
For example, some AGOA beneficiaries have expressed concern that proposals to extend DFQF 
access to all LDCs (including apparel exporters Bangladesh and Cambodia) will place Africa’s 
developing apparel industries in direct competition with these countries for U.S. market share, 
thereby eroding the preferences they currently exclusively enjoy. Some Members have sought an 
overhaul of preference programs to make it easier to graduate “advanced” developing countries 
75
 Paul Brenton and Caglar Ozden, Trade Preferences for Apparel and The Role of Rules of Origin – The Case of 
Africa, The World Bank, p. 2. 
76
 Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit., p. 18-19. 
77
 Ibid. 
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 “NGOs, Business Groups Debate Principles for Preference Reform,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 10, 2009, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), International Trade: U.S. Trade Preference Programs Provide Important 
Benefits, but a More Integrated Approach Would Better Ensure Programs Meet Shared Goals, GAO-08-443, March 
2008, p. 35, and Ibid., p.21. 
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such as India and Brazil from the GSP because of their opposition of U.S. interests in DDA 
80 
negotiations.80 Others in the academic world have also pointed to the benefits of focusing 
preference programs exclusively on the poorest of the developing countries. 81 
A second issue involves the opportunity costs of eligibility criteria. All U.S. programs, for 
example, require participating countries to meet numerous non-trade related criteria. These range 
from adopting labor commitments to ensuring assistance is forthcoming on drug interdiction, 
among other policies. While the United States readily acknowledges that these foreign policy 
concerns are part of their preference programs, they represent opportunity costs to the recipient 
country that some argue amounts to “politicizing trade.”82 
Effects on the U.S. Market 
The United States potentially faces costs in permitting unilateral trade preferences to developing 
countries. Domestic industries may face greater import competition as lower-cost imports enter 
the U.S. market, which could affect production, employment, and wages. However, preference 
programs are designed to limit the economic impact on domestic producers by various means. 
In the GSP, U.S. import-competing manufacturers are largely protected from severe economic 
impact by three features. First, some products, such as most textile and apparel goods, are 
designated “import sensitive” and are therefore ineligible for duty-free treatment.83 Second, 
“competitive need limits” in the GSP are triggered if imports of a product reach a certain 
threshold.84 Third, U.S. producers may petition the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
that GSP treatment granted to eligible articles be withdrawn. These petitions are considered 
during the annual review of the GSP program.85 
Although the smaller regional preference programs include preferences for additional “import-
sensitive” products, such as textiles and apparel, these differences do not greatly increase the 
potential for significant negative effects on U.S. producers. First, tariff lines given duty-free 
access can be very narrowly tailored to mitigate the impact of the preferences. Second, rules of 
origin are often carefully written to minimize effects on domestic producers. For example, for 
apparel imported from an AGOA country to receive the AGOA preference, no more than 10% (by 
weight) of the fiber and yarns making up the product can originate in a country other than the 
AGOA beneficiary or the United States.86 Some U.S. apparel producers actually benefit from 
preferences through an integrated value-added chain of production between the U.S. producers 
and those in Central America and the Caribbean, which lowers their overall costs relative to other 
major global producers, such as those in China.87 These cost factors have also assisted U.S. 
80
“Sen. Grassley Warns Brazil, India, on GSP; Stops Short of Predicting Graduation,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 19, 2006. 
“Ways and Means Likely to Seek One-Year Extension of GSP, ATPDEA,” Inside U.S. Trade, September 7, 2010. 
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Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 168-169. 
82
 For a summary, see Hoekman, Martin, and Braga, op. cit. 
83
 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(1). 
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 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c). 
85
 Provisions for the GSP Annual Review are set out at 15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(c)-(h). 
86
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(continued...) 
Congressional Research Service 16 
Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options 
producers in retaining U.S. market share that could have been lost to Asian producers following 
the expiration of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing on January 1, 2005.88 
Also in terms of U.S. benefits, some U.S. manufacturers who use imported inputs benefit from 
the lower cost of the intermediate manufactured goods and raw materials imported under 
preference programs.89 U.S. demand for certain individual products, such as jewelry, leather, and 
aluminum, is also quite significant. Ultimately, consumers also benefit from the lower prices of 
products imported duty-free under preference programs.90 
Even though preferences are structured to minimize the impact on U.S. producers, some amount 
of injury does occur. For example, the U.S. International Trade Commission found that U.S. 
growers of asparagus, fresh cut roses, chrysanthemums, carnations, and anthuriums may have 
experienced displacement of more than 5% of the value of production in 2005 because of imports 
that receive the ATPA preference.91 
With regard to losses in tariff revenues, over time, most of these costs have been shown to be 
relatively small. For example, CBO estimated that P.L. 111-124, which renewed the ATPA and 
GSP until December 31, 2010, amounted to a loss of revenue of $589 million in FY2010 and 
$196 million in FY2011.92 Imports entering duty-free are also relatively small compared to the 
total dollar value of imports to the United States. 
Overall effects on the U.S. economy are quite small. For example, the value of goods imported 
under the GSP program in 2008 represented only about $31.7 billion, compared to total U.S. 
imports of $2.1 trillion. Imports from all preference programs amounted to only about 5.2% of all 
U.S. trade (see Figure 2).93 
Legislative Options for Congress 
The debate in Congress over trade preferences encompasses multiple viewpoints. Leaving the 
programs largely as they are is one. Others see the need for revision to address specific problems. 
(...continued) 
March 2008, p. 11, http://www.gao.gov. 
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due in July 2014, CBO estimated that the net impact of the legislation would actually be much lower. 
93
 CRS estimates based on U.S. International Trade Commission figures. See also CRS Report RL33577, U.S. 
International Trade: Trends and Forecasts, by Dick K. Nanto and J. Michael Donnelly. 
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These include: (1) the role that preferences may play as a disincentive for beneficiary countries, 
particularly large developing countries, to embrace fully the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations;94 (2) problems of compliance with eligibility criteria;95 (3) the need to press for 
reciprocal trade treatments as poor countries reach a certain level of development; and (4) the 
need to focus them more on the least developed countries.96 Policy discussions tend to revolve 
around five basic program parameters: (1) renewal period, (2) harmonization, (3) country 
coverage, (4) product coverage, and (5) eligibility criteria. 
Renewal Period 
With the exception of CBERA, all preference programs are time-limited and Congress must 
reauthorize them if they are to continue. Although Congress has generally viewed these programs 
as temporary, it has historically chosen to renew them, usually without interruption and often with 
broad approval. Program beneficiaries, including governments, importers, and consuming 
industries, advocate diligently for continued program support. 
The primary argument for longer-term renewals is to establish a predictable trade environment 
that will attract long-term investment. Preferences translate into relatively lower costs of goods 
imported into the United States, which provide businesses with the incentive to operate in 
otherwise less competitive or desirable locations. Investors are more likely to consider long-term 
commitments when preferences are not subject to repeated short-term extensions, which adds an 
element of uncertainty to business planning, and also has implications for employment and 
economic stability in beneficiary countries. Extended preference horizons also support 
development of stable sourcing relationships and improved working environments given the 
emphasis eligibility criteria places on such factors as rule of law, good business practices, and 
worker rights.97 Some Members, though, view extended renewal as conditioned on other program 
changes such as those discussed below.98 
The 111th Congress has already acted to extend some preference programs. In the first session, it 
provided a one-year extension for the GSP and ATPA through December 31, 2010 (P.L. 111-124). 
In the second session, the HELP Act (P.L. 111-117) extended the CBTPA and Haiti HOPE Act 
through September 30, 2020. If Congress takes up comprehensive legislation, it is possible that it 
may consider the costs and benefits of harmonizing renewal periods and perhaps act to lengthen 
the renewal period for GSP and ATPA . 
94
 Bernard Hoekman, William J. Martin, and Carlos A. Primo Braga, Preference Erosion: The Terms of the Debate, 
World Bank, May 2006. 
95
 See Government Accountability Office, U.S. Trade Preference Programs: An Overview of Use by Beneficiaries and 
U.S. Administrative Reviews, GAO-07-1209, September 2007, p. 4. 
96
 Martin Vaughan, "Grassley Throws Up Obstacle to Trade Preference Renewal," Congress Daily, September 8, 2006. 
97
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Congress, 1st sess., November 17, 2009. Testimony of William Reinsch, President, 
National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC). See also Testimony of David Love, Senior Vice President and Chief Supply 
Chain Officer, Levi Strauss & Co., San Francisco, California. 
98
 Joseph J. Schatz, "Lawmakers Look to Trade Preferences to Boost Haiti's Recovery," CQ Today, March 10, 2010, p. 
6. 
Congressional Research Service 18 
Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options 
Harmonization 
Preference programs have similar, but not identical, program features. A key theme for renewal 
has been to review these policy parameters to determine if there are opportunities to simplify, 
harmonize, and make more consistent program features such as eligibility criteria, rules of origin, 
and product coverage. Some areas may be easier to harmonize than others. For example, it may 
be possible to standardize eligibility criteria across all programs. 
Harmonizing the complex “maze” of rules of origin could be a much greater challenge. Still, 
many view this as an important step toward making the programs operate more efficiently, not 
only from the perspective of businesses attempting to meet these rules, but also at the U.S. border 
where customs officials must determine the eligibility of each product entering the country. 
Because these rules were carefully crafted to maximize benefits to the intended countries, while 
minimizing any adverse effects on U.S. producers and preventing transshipment, harmonization 
may prove challenging to achieve in practice.99 
Trade capacity building (TCB), or training to improve the capability of firms in beneficiary 
countries to use these preferences, may provide a partial solution. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that research on the textile and apparel inputs industry 
in sub-Saharan Africa has confirmed that TCB is key to improvement of the competitiveness of 
the sector and utilization of preferences.100 
Country Coverage 
Although preference program legislation gives the President the authority to determine country 
eligibility based on designated criteria, Congress specifically designates overall which countries 
may receive the preferences. For example, Congress designated 48 sub-Saharan African countries 
as potentially eligible to receive the AGOA preference, but the President initially designated 34 
countries as eligible based on the criteria Congress set forth in the statute.101 Congress could 
legislatively expand or contract country coverage at any time. For example, several bills in 
Congress seek specifically to prevent Vietnam from obtaining GSP status due to its poor record 
on worker rights.102 
By definition, trade preferences are targeted toward developing countries, but there are different 
opinions regarding how broadly they should apply. Some argue that they should be targeted only 
99
 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. Preference Programs: Options for Reform, 111th Cong., 2nd 
sess., March 9, 2010. 
100
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Testimony of Loren Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade, 
GAO. 
10119 U.S.C. § 3706; Executive Office of the President, Proclamation 7350 of October 2, 2000, “To Implement the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act and to Designate Eritrea as a Beneficiary Developing Country for Purposes of the 
Generalized System of Preferences,” 65 Federal Register 59321, October 4, 2000. Currently, 40 countries are eligible 
to receive AGOA preferences. 
102CRS Report RL34702, Potential Trade Effects of Adding Vietnam to the Generalized System of Preferences 
Program, by Michael F. Martin and Vivian C. Jones. 
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toward LDCs that need them most.103 Higher or “middle” income developing countries resist this 
approach. 
Congress could also expand regional programs or create new preference programs in order to 
incorporate those LDCs not currently covered in AGOA or the other regional programs. Three 
bills introduced in the 111th Congress (H.R. 1837, S. 1665, and S. 780) would expand coverage in 
the ATPA to include Paraguay and/or Uruguay. The Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing 
Economies Act of 2009 (S. 1141) would authorize extending AGOA-like trade preferences for 
textile and apparel goods to non-African LDCs, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Maldives, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen. The bill would also extend 
product coverage for these countries to other “import-sensitive” items, subject to International 
Trade Commission (ITC) recommendation and Presidential determination. 
Another approach would be to reduce coverage for advanced developing countries, or require 
more reciprocity from these nations.104 Decreasing the number of country participants could also 
be achieved by applying mandatory country “graduation” to all preference programs, such as 
currently implemented in the GSP. According to the GSP statute, mandatory graduation occurs 
when a beneficiary country is determined to be a “high income country” as defined by official 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) statistics.105 Alternatively, 
Congress could choose another measure of income for graduation from preference programs, or 
require that country graduation be determined by a comprehensive review of its industries and 
economy.106 
One bill—the New Partnership for Trade Development Act of 2009 (S. 4101)—seeks to expand 
country coverage in textiles and apparel to more LDCs, while limiting the imports of more 
competitive countries. The legislation would amend the AGOA and GSP programs to expand 
preferences for LDCs, while strengthening and improving benefits to AGOA countries to ensure 
that existing African beneficiaries would not be negatively affected.107 The bill would strengthen 
AGOA preferences by granting DFQF treatment to all least-developed AGOA countries; applying 
the GSP 35% value-added rules, and extending the third-country fabric provision until September 
30, 2015.108 It would also extend DFQF benefits to additional eligible non-African LDCs. For 
those countries that are already “significant apparel suppliers” to the United States,109 the bill 
103Center for Global Development, Open Markets for the Poorest Countries, p. 6; Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, pp. 
167-168, and Amy Tsul, “Senate Finance Chairman Baucus, Grassley Describe Trade Preference Reform Elements,” 
International Trade Daily, March 10, 2010. 
104U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. Preference Programs: Options for Reform, 111th Cong., 2nd 
sess., March 9, 2010, Statement of Senator Charles Grassley. 
10519 U.S.C. § 2462(e). The World Bank currently uses gross national income (GNI) per capita as its main indicator for 
classifying economies, and countries are determined to be “high income” if they have reached a per capita income level 
of $11,906 or more. See World Bank, Country Classifications, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. 
106
 The President already has authority to do this as outlined in GSP discretionary criteria. See 19 U.S.C.§ 2462(c)(2). 
107House of Representatives, Office of Representative Jim McDermott, “Rep. McDermott Introduces Bill to Improve 
Trade Benefits to Poor Countries,” Press Release, November 20, 2009. 
108
 Third-country fabric provisions allow an apparel product to contain some fabric inputs originating anywhere in the 
world and still be imported duty-free under a preference program. The AGOA preference includes a Special Rule (in 
force until September 30, 2012) for lesser-developed beneficiaries allowing them to include a limited amount of third-
party fabric in AGOA apparel imports. 
109H.R. 4101 defines a “significant apparel supplier” as an LDC beneficiary from which total U.S. apparel imports in a 
calendar year exceed 2% of the aggregate square meter equivalents of all U.S. apparel imports in that year. 
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would limit apparel imports eligible for preferences. The bill would also allow extension of 
coverage to articles deemed “import-sensitive” with respect to the GSP under certain conditions. 
The bill would require a transparent decision-making process regarding GSP competitive need 
limit waivers. The bill would continue to extend benefits to “upper-middle income” GSP 
beneficiaries, provided that they, in turn, grant trade preferences to LDCs and sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
Eligibility Criteria 
Some importers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocate amending preference 
program eligibility criteria so that they are “clear, commercially meaningful, and achievable.”110 
Proponents of this view tend to differ in their selection of criteria, however. For example, some 
NGO advocates object to conditions requiring protection of intellectual property on the grounds 
that the application of these criteria can be “arbitrary and unpredictable.”111 Business proponents, 
however, might be more favorable to inclusion of intellectual property eligibility criteria on the 
grounds that such protections help them to preserve the value of their products. 
An alternative might be to reconstitute preference programs to include incentives to beneficiaries 
other than tariff reductions, or to create an additional preference program for countries that are 
willing to comply with additional U.S. objectives. The European Union, for example, has crafted 
a “GSP-plus” program that offers additional product coverage to particularly vulnerable 
developing countries, provided that they have ratified and implemented a number of core 
international conventions on human rights, labor rights, good governance and environmental 
protection.112 
Product Coverage 
Congress could re-evaluate current product coverage, and decide to expand or eliminate certain 
products from preference programs. For example preference advocates argue that immediate 
DFQF could be extended to all LDCs with minimal effects on the U.S. economy.113 
No U.S. preference program as currently authorized provides complete DFQF access. For 
example, some U.S. products, such as certain apparel, leather, electronics, steel, and glass 
products, are deemed “import-sensitive” in GSP due to possible negative effects on U.S. domestic 
producers. In terms of DFQF access for textiles and ready-made apparel products, the AGOA 
program is the broadest, although significant restrictions are still in place (i.e., caps are placed on 
use of yarns and fabrics that are of third-country or sub-Saharan African origin). 
110
 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and Future of the U.S. 
Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009, Statement for the Record, U.S. Preference Reform 
Working Group. 
111
 Kimberley Ann Elliott, et al., Open Markets for the Poorest Countries: Trade Preferences that Work., Center for 
Global Development, April 2010, p. 13. 
112
 European Commission, Generalized System of Preferences, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-
agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/index_en.htm. 
113See Kimberly Ann Elliott, et al., Open Markets for the Poorest Countries: Trade Preferences that Work, Center for 
Global Development, April 2010. 
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As part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations, the United States and 
other developed country WTO members and “developing country members declaring themselves 
in a position to do so” agreed to provide DFQF access, but these commitments will not take effect 
until (or unless) the Doha Round is completed.114 
Some in Congress favor expanding product coverage in preference programs. For example, 
several bills in the 111th Congress seek to expand AGOA-like textile and apparel benefits to other 
non-African LDCs—a move that some African countries oppose due to concerns that they would 
be put at a disadvantage compared to LDCs like Cambodia and Bangladesh that have 
sophisticated, established apparel industries already in place.115 
If Congress chose to expand or harmonize product coverage, it could also shield import-
competing U.S. industries by applying an across-the-board cap on preferential access. For 
example, the CNL thresholds that apply in GSP (discussed above) could be implemented in all 
programs, or be enacted in a harmonized program. Congress could also provide tariff reductions 
(as opposed to duty-free access) for certain “import-sensitive” products in all U.S. preference 
programs as currently implemented. This approach is similar to the Australian GSP program, 
which provides a 5% preference margin on products with tariffs over 5%, rather than strictly 
duty-free access.116 
Preferences also differ with regard to cumulation, which allows for combining inputs from 
numerous beneficiary countries under one or more preference programs as long as a substantial 
transformation still occurs in the beneficiary country. For example, one of the requirements for 
apparel articles to qualify for the ATPA states that they may be sewn or assembled in one or more 
ATPA beneficiary countries or the United States. In the GSP, certain pre-designated regional 
groups may meet the value-added requirement by combining (cumulating) inputs in order to 
qualify for preferential access. The Haiti HOPE Act provisions also allow for regional cumulation 
and limited use of third-party materials. Allowing LDC beneficiaries to “cumulate” inputs from 
all developing countries could provide flexibility and could have the added effect of simplifying 
rules of origin.117 Congress could restrict or expand the availability of preferences by modifying 
these provisions to include a greater or lesser percentage of inputs from other beneficiary 
countries, or by permitting a larger percentage of third-party inputs. 
Outlook 
The 111th Congress has held hearings on trade preference programs in both the House and Senate, 
where some Members expressed interest in amending and harmonizing some of the preferences 
provisions. As specialized programs intended to serve as a form of assistance to developing 
countries, program design is critical in determining whether those countries most in need are 
114
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, Annex F, December 18, 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC. 
115
 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Operation, Impact, and 
Future of the U.S. Preference Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009, Statement for the Record, African 
Cotton and Textiles Industries Federation. 
116
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), GSP - Handbook on the Scheme of Australia, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.56, 2000. 
117
 Kimberly Ann Elliott, et al., Open Markets for the Poorest Countries: Trade Preferences that Work, Center for 
Global Development, April 2010, pp. 9-10. 
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being well served. Because these are complex programs with multiple design features, evaluating 
them is a challenging and complicated exercise. If the 111th Congress does not take up legislation 
that would reform preference programs, the issue will likely continue to be prominent in the 112th 
Congress. 
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Appendix. Eligible Countries and Products 
Imported by Preference Program 
Table A-1. Eligible Countries by Preference Program 
(Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) in Italics) 
Designated 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Colombia 
Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
(GSP) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Economic 
Recovery Act 
(CBERA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Trade 
Partnership Act 
of 2000 
(CBTPA) 
X 
X 
Andean Trade 
Preference Act 
(ATPA) 
X 
African Growth 
and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Designated 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
Comoros 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
Congo (Kinshasa) 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
India 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
(GSP) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Economic 
Recovery Act 
(CBERA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Trade 
Partnership Act 
of 2000 
(CBTPA) 
X 
X 
X 
Andean Trade 
Preference Act 
(ATPA) 
X 
African Growth 
and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Designated 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
Kosovo 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Montserrat 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Niger 
Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
(GSP) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Economic 
Recovery Act 
(CBERA) 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Trade 
Partnership Act 
of 2000 
(CBTPA) 
X 
Andean Trade 
Preference Act 
(ATPA) 
X 
African Growth 
and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Designated 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
Saint Lucia 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts/Nevis 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
(GSP) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Economic 
Recovery Act 
(CBERA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Trade 
Partnership Act 
of 2000 
(CBTPA) 
X 
X 
Andean Trade 
Preference Act 
(ATPA) 
African Growth 
and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Congressional Research Service 27 
Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options 
Designated 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
Virgin Islands, 
British 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
(GSP) 
X 
X 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Economic 
Recovery Act 
(CBERA) 
X 
Caribbean Basin 
Trade 
Partnership Act 
of 2000 
(CBTPA) 
Andean Trade 
Preference Act 
(ATPA) 
African Growth 
and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) 
X 
Source: Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) Revision 1, July 1, 2010. See General Notes 
4, 7, 16, and 17 for definitive country listings. 
Notes: GSP Independent Countries only. See HTSUS General Note 4 for a listing of Non-Independent 
Countries and Territories, and Associations of Countries that are treated as one country for purposes of the 
GSP. 
LDCs are designated as such for purposes of the GSP and receive duty-free access to additional tariff lines. 
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Table A-2. Major U.S. Imports by Preference Program 
Top 15 U.S. Imports under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 2008 
HTS Subheading and Description Actual U.S. 
Dollars 
27090020 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or 9,740,681,021 
more (LDC only) 
27090010 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing under 25 degrees 1,024,288,176 
A.P.I. (LDC only) 
71121150 - Silver articles of jewelry and parts thereof, not elsewhere specified, valued over $18 481,322,767 
per dozen pieces or parts 
71131929 - Gold necklaces and neck chains 381,788,293 
40111010 - New pneumatic radial tires, of rubber, of a kind used on motor cars 379,467,478 
76061230 – Aluminum alloy, plates/sheets/strip 339,609,297 
71131950 - Precious metal (other than silver) articles of jewelry and parts thereof, whether or 322,809,325 
not plated or clad with precious metal, not elsewhere specified 
39076000 – Polyethylene terephthalate in primary forms 253,278,318 
40112010 - New pneumatic radial tires, of rubber, of a kind used on buses or trucks 207,368,571 
21069099 - Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included, not canned or frozen 165,198,981 
68029900 - Monumental or building stone & arts. thereof, further worked than simply cut/sawn, 154,998,583 
not elsewhere specified 
40151910 – Seamless gloves of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber, other than surgical or 140,171,668 
medical gloves 
90015000 – Spectacle lenses of materials other than glass, unmounted 118,288,524 
85042300 - Liquid dielectric transformers having a power handling capacity exceeding 10,000 kVA 108,983,792 
17011110 - Cane sugar, raw, in solid form, without added flavoring or coloring 89,661,957 
Subtotal - GSP Imports Above: 13,907,916,751 
All Other: 17,754,837,014 
Total GSP Imports: 31,662,753,765 
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Top 15 U.S. Imports under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 2008 
HTS Subheading and Description Actual U.S. 
Dollars 
29851120 – Methanol (Methyl alcohol), other than imported only for use in producing synthetic 1,175,154,686 
natural gas (SNG) or for direct use as fuel 
22071060 - Undenatured ethyl alcohol of 80% by volume alcohol or higher, for non-beverage 483,063,905 
purposes 
08043040 - Pineapples, fresh or dried, not reduced in size, in crates or other packages 393,122,221 
39031100 - Polystyrene, expandable, in primary forms 135,521,790 
20091100 - Orange juice, frozen, unfermented and not containing added spirits 64,689,149 
07149020 - Fresh or chilled yams, whether or not sliced or in the form of pellets 29,915,488 
71081250 - Gold, nonmonetary, unwrought 26,890,097 
17011110 - Cane sugar, raw, in solid form, without added flavoring or coloring 22,300,311 
22072000 - Ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured, of any strength 20,003,309 
08072000 - Papayas (papaws), fresh 14,048,666 
16041440 - Tunas and skipjack, not in airtight containers, not in oil, in bulk or in immediate 12,925,254 
containers weighing with contents over 6.8 kg each 
22071030 - Undenatured ethyl alcohol of 80 % by volume of alcohol or higher, for beverage 8,685,447 
purposes 
85291020 - Television antennas and antenna reflectors, and parts suitable for use therewith 7,652,688 
08045040 - Guavas, mangoes, and mangosteens, fresh, if entered during the period September 1 5,173,035 
through May 31, inclusive 
22029090 - Nonalcoholic beverages, not elsewhere specified not including fruit or vegetable 4,226,852 
juices of heading 2009 
Subtotal - Total CBERA Products Above: 2,403,372,898 
All Other: 619,158,293 
Total CBERA Imports: 3,022,531,191 
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Top 15 U.S. Imports under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), 2008 
HTS Subheading and Description Actual U.S. 
Dollars 
27099920 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or 903,985,774 
more 
61091000 - T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 168,910,180 
61102020 – Sweaters, pullovers and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not 145,801,021 
elsewhere specified 
27101125 – Naphthas (excluding motor fuel/motor fuel blended stock) from petroleum oils & 143,644,824 
bituminous minerals (o/than crude) 
62034240 - Men's or boys' trousers and shorts, not bibs, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not 50,873,428 
containing 15% or more by weight of down 
61099010 - T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or crocheted, of man-made 22,106,139 
fibers 
27101905 -Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from 19,571,420 
bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I. 
62034340 - Men's or boys' trousers, breeches & shorts, of synthetic fibers, containing under 15% 19,062,093 
weight down, and containing under 36% weight wool, not water resistant 
27101145 - Light oil mixtures of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals(other 15,073,275 
than crude) 
62053020 - Men's or boys' shirts, not knitted or crocheted, of manmade fibers, not elsewhere 6,224,233 
specified 
16041430 - Tunas and skipjack, not in oil, in airtight containers, not over 7 kg, not a product of 2,555,140 
U.S. possessions, over quota 
61081100 - Women's or girls' slips and petticoats, knitted or crocheted, of man-made fibers 1,660,626 
61143020 – Bodysuits and bodyshirts, knitted or crocheted, of man-made fibers 1,321,716 
27101930 - Lubricating oils, with or without additives, from petroleum oils and bituminous 603,007 
minerals (o/than crude) 
61012000 - Men's or boys' overcoats, carcoats, capes, cloaks, anoraks, windbreakers and similar 289,819 
articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 
Total CBTPA Items Above: 1,501,682,695 
All other CBTPA: 199,886,135 
Total CBTPA Imports: 1,701,568,830 
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Top 15 U.S. Imports under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 2008 
HTS Subheading and Description Actual U.S. 
Dollars 
27090010 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing under 25 degrees 10,128,076,615 
A.P.I. 
27090020 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or 2,078,529,699 
more 
74031100 - Refined copper cathodes and sections of cathodes 844,388,290 
27101905 – Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from 628,662,292 
bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I. 
27101125 -Naphthas (except motor fuel/motor fuel blended stock) from petroleum oils & 377,140,870 
bituminous minerals (other than crude) 
06031100 - Sweetheart, Spray and other Roses, fresh cut 310,291,331 
61102020 - Sweaters, pullovers and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not 239,924,774 
elsewhere specified 
06031900 - fresh cut, Anthuriums, Alstroemeria, Gypsophilia, Lilies, Snapdragons and flowers, not 192,515,808 
elsewhere specified 
61051000 – Men's or boys' shirts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 176,191,218 
61091000 - T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 162,482,114 
7092090 - Asparagus, not elsewhere specified, fresh or chilled 145,195,953 
62034240 - Men's or boys' trousers and shorts, not bibs, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not 85,840,968 
containing 15% or more by weight of down 
16041430 - Tunas and skipjack, not in oil, in airtight containers, not over 7 kg, not a product of 70,067,275 
U.S. possessions, over quota 
06034240 - Chrysanthemums, fresh cut 66,942,147 
06031270 - Other Carnations, fresh cut 37,759,897 
Subtotal - All ATPA Items Above: 15,544,009,251 
All Other: 1,698,665,706 
Total ATPA Imports: 17,242,674,957 
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Top 15 U.S. Imports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 2008 
HTS Subheading and Description Actual U.S. 
Dollars 
27090020 - Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or 48,518,019,968 
more 
27090010 - Petroleum oils from bituminous minerals testing under 25 degrees A.P.I. 2,731,811,660 
87032300 -Motor cars & other motor vehicles for transport of persons, with spark-ignition 1,553,389,022 
internal combustion reciprocal piston engine with cylinder capacity of 1500 cc and not more than 
3000 cc 
27101905 - Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from 750,982,539 
bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I. 
27101125 -Naphthas (except motor fuel/motor fuel blended stock) from petroleum oils & 658,853,842 
bituminous minerals (other than crude) 
72021150 - Ferromanganese containing by weight more than 4 % carbon 367,406,195 
62046240 -Women's or girls' trousers, breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton, 256,791,659 
not elsewhere specified 
87032400 - Motor cars & other motor vehicles for transport of persons, with spark internal 250,978,213 
combustion reciprocating piston engine with cylinder capacity of 3000 cc. 
61102020 -Sweaters, pullovers and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not elsewhere 161,602,238 
specified 
62034240 - Men's or boys' trousers and shorts, not bibs, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not 152,706,522 
containing 15% or more by weight of down 
62052020 - Men's or boys' shirts, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton, not elsewhere specified 81,008,135 
61103030 - Sweaters, pullovers and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of manmade fibers, not 75,623,601 
elsewhere specified 
38237060 -Industrial fatty alcohols other than derived from fatty substances of animal or 73,833,844 
vegetable origin 
61046220 - Women's or girls' trousers, breeches and shorts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 73,810,107 
27101145 - Light oil mixtures of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals(other 50,463,377 
than crude) or preparations 70% or more by weight from petroleum oils, not elsewhere specified 
Subtotal - AGOA Imports Above: 55,757,280,922 
All Other: 616,369,979 
Total AGOA Imports: 56,373,650,901 
Source: Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); International Trade Commission Trade 
Dataweb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
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